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In October 2022, when Rishi Sunak took over as British prime minister, he was the fifth consecutive UK leader to occupy the role in six years.

Triggered in the UK by Britain's EU exit, this represented exceptional governmental instability. So what term captures what is unfolding in France, now on its sixth prime minister in two years – with three in the last ten months?

The latest prime minister, the recently reappointed Sébastien Lecornu, may have secured a temporary reprieve on that day, sacrificing Emmanuel Macron’s flagship pensions overhaul in exchange for opposition Socialist votes as the cost of his administration's continuation.

But it is, at best, a temporary fix. The EU’s second-largest economy is trapped in a political permacrisis, the scale of which it has not witnessed for many years – perhaps not since the establishment of its Fifth Republic in 1958 – and from which there seems no easy escape.

Governing Without a Majority

Essential context: from the moment Macron called an risky early parliamentary vote in 2024, France has had a divided assembly split into three warring blocs – left, far right and his own centrist coalition – without any group holding a clear majority.

At the same time, the country faces twin financial emergencies: its national debt level and budget shortfall are now almost twice the EU threshold, and strict legal timelines to pass a 2026 budget that starts controlling expenditures are nigh.

In this challenging environment, both Lecornu’s immediate predecessors – Michel Barnier, who lasted from September to December 2024, and François Bayrou, who took office from December 2024 to September 2025 – were ousted by the assembly.

In mid-September, the president appointed his trusted associate Lecornu as his latest PM. But when, just over a fortnight later, Lecornu unveiled his new cabinet – which turned out to be much the same as the old one – he faced fury from both supporters and rivals.

So much so that the following day, he stepped down. After just 27 days in office, Lecornu became the briefest-serving prime minister in modern French history. In a respectful address, he blamed political intransigence, saying “party loyalties” and “certain egos” would make his job all but impossible.

Another twist in the tale: shortly after Lecornu’s resignation, Macron asked him to stay on for another 48 hours in a last-ditch effort to salvage cross-party backing – a task, to put it gently, not without complications.

Next, two of Macron’s former PMs openly criticized the embattled president. Meanwhile, the right-wing RN and leftist LFI declined to engage with Lecornu, vowing to reject any and every new government unless there were snap elections.

Lecornu stuck at his job, talking to everyone who was prepared to hear him out. At the end of his 48 hours, he appeared on television to say he believed “a path still existed” to prevent a vote. The leader's team confirmed the president would appoint a new prime minister 48 hours later.

Macron honored his word – and on that Friday reappointed Sébastien Lecornu. So recently – with Macron helpfully sniping from the sidelines that the country’s rival political parties were “fuelling division” and “solely responsible for this chaos” – was Lecornu’s moment of truth. Could he survive – and can he pass that vital budget?

In a high-stakes speech, the 39-year-old PM outlined his financial plans, giving the centre-left Socialist party (PS), who oppose Macron’s controversial pension changes, what they were waiting for: Macron’s flagship reform would be frozen until 2027.

With the right-wing LR already supportive, the Socialists said they would refuse to support no-confidence motions tabled against Lecornu by the far right and radical left – meaning the administration would likely endure those votes, scheduled for Thursday.

It is, nevertheless, far from guaranteed to be able to approve its €30bn austerity budget: the PS explicitly warned that it would be seeking more concessions. “This,” said its leader, Olivier Faure, “is just the start.”

A Cultural Shift

The problem is, the more Lecornu cedes to the centre-left, the more opposition he'll face from the right. And, similar to the Socialists, the conservatives are themselves divided over how to handle the new government – some are still itching to topple it.

A look at the seat numbers shows how difficult his mission – and longer-term survival – will be. A total of 264 deputies from the far-right RN, radical-left LFI, Greens, Communists and UDR seek his removal.

To succeed, they need a 288-vote majority in parliament – so if they can convince only 24 of the PS’s 69 members or the LR’s 47 (or both) to vote with them, Macron’s fifth unstable premier in 24 months is, similar to his forerunners, toast.

Few would bet against that happening sooner rather than later. Even if, by an unlikely turn, the dysfunctional assembly summons up the collective responsibility to approve a budget this year, the prospects for the government beyond that look bleak.

So is there a way out? Early elections would be doubtful to resolve the issue: surveys indicate pretty much every party bar the RN would lose seats, but there would still be no clear majority. A new prime minister would face the same intractable arithmetic.

Another possibility might be for Macron himself to resign. After a presidential vote, his successor would dissolve parliament and hope to secure a parliamentary majority in the following election. But this also remains unclear.

Surveys show the next occupant of the Elysée Palace will be Le Pen or Bardella. There is at least an odds-on chance that France’s voters, having chosen a far-right leader, might reconsider giving them parliamentary power.

Ultimately, France may not emerge from its quagmire until its politicians accept the new political reality, which is that clear majorities are a thing of the past, absolute victory is obsolete, and negotiation doesn't mean defeat.

Numerous observers believe that transformation will not be possible under the existing governmental framework. “This isn't a standard political crisis, but a crise de régime” that will prove anything but temporary.

“The regime … was never designed to facilitate – and even disincentivizes – the formation of ruling alliances common in the rest of Europe. The Fifth Republic may well have entered its terminal phase.”